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California Garageman's Liens: Procedural
Due Process Restored
Recently there has developed a trend which is expanding the
protection afforded by procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. On April 10, 1974,
the Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, took another step
forward in this movement. In Adams v. Department of Motor
Vehicles' the court held that the state's involvement in imposition
and enforcement of garageman's liens constituted "state action" for
due process purposes, that provision for interim retention in the
absence of prior notice or hearing, pending payment or sale of the
car did not deny owners due process, and that provisions which
permitted involuntary sale and transfer of vehicles without afford-
ing owner an opportunity for a hearing did deny owners due
process. 2
In Adams, petitioner Isabell Adams challenged the constitutional-
ity of the California garageman's labor and materials lien, Civil
Code 3068 (a), 3071, 3072, 3073, and 3074. These statutes authorized
the garageman to a lien on the vehicles, upon which he had made
repairs, as well as permitting him to retain and eventually sell
them. Then upon proof of the lien sale and notice to the owner,
the California Department of Motor Vehicles was required to trans-
fer registration of the car to the purchaser without a prior hearing.
Petitioner Adams had disputed the amount of a repair bill for
labor and materials supplied by real party in interest Anthony
Stellato on petitioner's car. After Adams refused to pay, Stellato
pursuant to statute,3 retained possession of the auto and later sold
it. Whereupon the buyer of said auto, Moseley, filed an "Applica-
tion for Registration of Vehicle Sold at Lien Sale" with the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles. The petitioner sought to restrain the De-
partment from recording transfer of title on her car purchased
through such lien sale.
1. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Adams].
2. Id.
3. CAL. COv. CODE § 3071 (West 1974).
DISPOSITION By THE COURT
The court's first task was to establish sufficient state action in
seizing and selling the property of petitioner Adams by Stellato.
Admitting that the seizure and sale were not directly effected by
state officers or court process, the court stated, pursuant to a host
of cases4 that:
[Direct] involvement is not necessary to a determination of state
action, for private conduct may become so entwined with govern-
mental action as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 13, of the California Con-
stitution.5
In this case, not only was the procedure for enforcement of the
vehicle service lien created and governed by statute, but the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles was required to transfer and record
title to the buyer of the auto at the lien sale. The court specified
that the repair contract did not, by its own terms, provide for
seizure or sale. Therefore, although Stellato, a private individual
retained and sold the car, he was able to do so only by statutes
which authorized him to proceed in such a manner. This statutory
method authorizing Stellato to act, constituted state action.6
Having dispensed with the question of state action, the court
seized upon the basic issue of due process. The California Supreme
Court, relying on a series of federal and California cases, concluded
that, "procedural due process requires.. . the giving of notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before the state, in aid of a creditor,
may deprive a debtor of a significant property interest, including
temporary use and enjoyment. 7 The court also stated that excep-
tions to this principle would be justifiable only in "extraordinary
circumstances".8
Examples of such extraordinary circumstances where summary
procedures alone may satisfy the requirements of due process were
outlined in Fuentes v. Shevin.9
[The] Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect
the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
national war effort, to protect against the. economic disaster of a
4. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1969); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wil-
mington Port Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
5. 11 Cal. 3d at 152, 520 P.2d at 964, 113 Cal. Rptr, at 148-49.
6. Id. at 153, 520 P.2d at 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
7. Id. at 153, 520 P.2d at 964, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
8. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
9. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and
contaminated food.10
The California court categorically rejected any comparison be-
tween the garageman's lien law, which applies to the furnishing
of labor and materials in repair of motor vehicles, and such limited
situations as those enumerated above. In support of the necessity
for more than mere summary procedures, the court mentioned five
cases which had invalidated statutes providing for wage garnish-
ment," claim and delivery,'12 prejudgment attachment of checking
accounts 13 and replevin of household goods.14 Thus, the general
rule established by these cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family
Finance'5 and clarified by Fuentes v. Shevin,16 is that except in
extraordinary situations, any prejudgment remedy violated proce-
dural due process if it does not provide notice and opportunity for
hearing before a person is deprived of a significant property or
possessory interest.
In determining whether the lien law as applied in the instant
case violated procedural due process, the court discussed two dis-
tinct possibilities. The first possible violation was the lien law per-
mitting the garageman interim retention of the auto without prior
notice or hearing pending payment or sale of the car.17 The court
distinguished the above five cases led by Sniadach with the case
under discussion in two respects. In Adams, the possessory interest
of the garageman was not the general claim of an attaching or gar-
nisheeing creditor unrelated to the certain property seized. Rather,
it was a claim in which the creditor-garageman added his own labor
and materials to the specific property which he retained.
However, the court was not willing to uphold the garageman's
interim retention solely on the superiority of his interest to that
of an attaching or garnisheeing creditor. Therefor, Justice Clarke,
10. Id. at 91-92.
11. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); McCallop
v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
12. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
13. Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971).
14. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. 11 Cal. 3d at 154, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
speaking for the court emphasized that the creditor here was in
rightful possession at the time he asserted his lien.
To strike down the garageman's possessory lien would be to alter
the status quo in favor of an opposing claimant; the garageman
would be deprived of his possessory interest precisely as were the
debtors'in Shevin and Blair.18
These two cases adhered to the policy that a possessory right
vested in possession until such conflicting claims to possession of
the property were judicially settled. 19 Since the auto was in
Stellato's possession at the time the dispute arose, by following the
above principle, he had the right to retain the vehicle temporarily.
As to the question of whether permanent retention and sale pur-
suant to statute violated due process, the California Supreme Court
focused its discussion on the adequacy of the form of legal proce-
dures granted. by Civil Code 3071, 3072, 3073, and 3074 if the original
owner refused to pay. The lienholder, if not paid within 10 days
after the amount becomes due, could proceed to sell the property
at public auction. 20 These sections also provided for at least 10
days but not more than 20 days notice to the public of such sale
and 20 days notice to owners by registered mail. This period for
notice could be reduced to 10 days if the lienholder was able to
certify, under penalty of perjury, that the vehicle is worth less than
$200.00.21 Then, a right of redemption was allowed the original
owner if, within 20 days after the lien sale, he paid the costs and
expenses of the sale and repairs plus interest.22
The court concluded after reviewing these statutes, that within
30 days after the owner's initial refusal to pay (or 20 days if the
value of the car was less than $200.00), a lien sale could be held.23
Furthermore, the owner's right to redeem his vehicle, an addi-
tional grace period of 20 days, could only be utilized if the vehicle
was worth more than $200.00.
In response to the suggestion that petitioner Adams, though hav-
ing no right to a prior hearing pursuant to statute, did have an
"opportunity to institute a civil action against the garageman to
contest the propriety of the sale of the car, '24 the court ascertained
that such was not sufficient. The court stressed that only a slight
18. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
19. Id.
20. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3071 (West 1974).
21. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3072-73 (West 1974).
22. CAL. CMv. CODE § 3074 (West 1974).
23. 11 Cal. 3d at 155-56, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
24. Id.
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possibility existed that trial of a contested lien claim would be held
within the period before title was transferred to the buyer. Under
California Rules of Court rules 220 and 509, the trial may be set
as much as 12 weeks from the pretrial conference. 25 Inasmuch as
California law has no provision for accelerated hearings of con-
tested lien claims, 26 a debtor's only recourse would be to an injunc-
tion or temporary restraining order. Both injunction and tempo-
rary restraining orders have long been regarded as extraordinary
remedies only to be granted with caution. 27 Both of these remedies
therefor, lacked the assurance that a hearing prior to sale of the
vehicle would definitely occur.
Of course, the owner Adams, might have sought a motion to spe-
cifically set the trial date as well as possibly bringing a suit in con-
version of the auto. Yet neither of these courses of action would
be adequate to secure due process for the owner. Under the former,
the granting of such motion is again not a matter of right, but in-
stead lies within the discretion of the court.28 Whereas, only by
proceeding in small claims court under conversion (where the
amount of the vehicle would be limited to $500.00), could the owner,
if he acted at once upon assertion of the garageman's lien secure
his rights. 29 Still, if the car were valued at less than $200.00 no
assurance of due process would be available since the owner has
no right of redemption after the 10 days notice following his initial
payment period.30
Relying on the above facts and rationale, the California Supreme
Court invalidated sections 3071, 3072, 3073, and 3074 of the Civil
Code because they deprived the owner of a vehicle due process of
law. The Court, however, clearly limited its decision stating in
no uncertain terms that it has not reached the validity of creditors
remedies provided by private agreements, foreclosure under a deed,
private repossession by contract, or any other form of artisan's lien
provided by statute in California.31 Nor was the entire statutory
25. CAL. CT. R. 151, 188 (West 1974).
26. 11 Cal. 3d at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
27. 2 Witkin, CAL. Poc. § 78 at 1516 (2d ed. 1970).
28. CAL. CT. R., 225, 513 (West 1974).
29. 11 Cal. 3d at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
30. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3074 (West 1974).
31. 11 Cal. 3d at 157, 520 P.2d at 968, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
scheme invalid. A garageman could still retain possession of a ve-
hicle when the owner refuses to pay for its repair. But, as a result
of the instant case, the garageman can no longer sell the car to
satisfy his claim. "The parties are relegated to such remedies as
are provided by common law or statute consonant with require-
ments of due process. '3 2 It is interesting to note that the court
chose the more restrained approach by stressing common law and
statutory remedies, rather than requiring the Department of Motor
Vehicles itself to provide the hearing as is necessary in certain
license suspension situations.5 3
As one may perceive from the California Supreme Court's dis-
position of Adams, the due process clause since Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corporation34 in 1969, has developed into an expanded and
reinforced right insuring debtors against a variety of statutory pre-
judgment remedies throughout the nation. In California, Adams
by invalidating sections 3071, 3072, 3073, and 3074 of the Civil Code,
takes one more thrust forward by securing adequate protection of
a debtor's right to property under both the federal and state consti-
tutions.8 5
STATUTORY REFORM By THE LEGISLATURE
The court, holding these sections unconstitutional, provided the
legislature with an immediate opportunity to restore procedural due
process to the statutory scheme of sale and transfer under a garage-
man's lien. The concrete effect of the California Supreme Court's
ruling in Adams materialized during the 1973-1974 regular session
of the State Legislature with the amendment of sections 3071, 3072,
and the addition of 3071.5.
The pertinent provisions of Civil Code 3071 as now amended allow
a lien holder, if not paid the amount due, to sell the property pur-
suant to section 3072 and 3073 only if:
(1) [An] authorization to conduct a lien sale has been issued by
the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to this section, (2) ajudgment has been entered in favor of the lienholder on the claim
32. Id. Under common law, any attempt to foreclose a lien by sale by
the lienholder in possession was regarded as conversion. The remedy per-
mitted to a lienholder was to bring an action based on his claim and secure
a writ of execution upon obtaining a judgment.
33. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 14100 (West 1971) and Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 198, 81 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1969).
34. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
35. This seems to follow the Court's basis for similar decisions, relating
to the denial of procedural due process, by using both the California and
Federal Constitutions.
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which gives rise to the lien or (3) the registered and legal owner
of the vehicle has signed, after the lien has arisen, a release of any -
interest in the vehicle in the form prescribed in 3071.536
No longer may a garageman sell a vehicle unless allowance has
been made for notice and opportunity for a hearing to the debtor.
The authorization to conduct the lien sale is to be issued by the
Department only after receipt of an application pursuant to section
3071 of the Civil Code. Once received, notice will then be prepared
and sent to the debtor which will state that such application for
lien sale has been received and that:
(i) [The] person has a legal right to a hearing in court (ii) if a
hearing in court is desired, the enclosed declaration under penalty
of perjury must be signed and returned, and (iii) if the declaration
is signed and returned, the lien-holder will be allowed to sell the
vehicle only if he obtains a judgement in court or obtains a release
from the registered and legal owner.37
The release mentioned is an alternative to a judgment, which will
permit a lien sale. It must be in at least 12 point type, contain
a statement that the person releasing the interest, understands that
he has a legal right to a hearing in court prior to any sale and
that he is giving up the right to contest the claim.88 It must also
include a statement that the person releasing gives up any interest
in the vehicle and the lienholder now has permission to sell the
vehicle.8 9
Sections 3071 and 3071.5 of the Civil Code as amended, together
with the remainder of the statutory scheme, crystallize the impact
of the California Supreme Court's disposition of Adams guarantee-
ing procedural due process in the enforcement of the garageman's
lien. Taking its cue from Adams, the legislature has effectively
succeeded in providing for the parties a remedy "By . .. statute
consonant with requirements of due process.
'40
LEN CARAFA
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3071 (West Supp. 1975).
37. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3071(c) (2) (West Supp. 1975).
38. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3071.5 (West Supp. 1975).
39. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3071.5(b) (5) (West Supp. 1975).
40. 11 Cal. 3d at 157, 520 P.2d at 968, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
